After nearly two decades of effort and intense negotiations, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2719 on December 21, 2023. The resolution represents a major step forward in the partnership between the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU), and provides a framework for AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) to access UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The imperative of providing sustainable and predictable funding for AU-led PSOs was echoed in the UN General Assembly's recently adopted Pact for the Future, indicating broad support for the UN-AU partnership across the UN membership. While the Council has previously provided assessed financing for AU-led PSOs on an exceptional basis, resolution 2719 helps regularize this process.
This article outlines the key challenges and critical steps needed to ensure the resolution's successful implementation.
Where Are We Now?
While the importance of the resolution should not be understated, much of the real work to operationalize it is still ongoing. During the final stages of negotiations in December, member states were up against the clock as Ghana (which was leading the process) was wrapping up the final days of its Council term. Thus, parts of the resolution were left intentionally vague to garner the necessary support before the year's end.
The UN and AU are currently working on joint planning guidelines, which will be critical to the operationalization of resolution 2719. This includes specifics of how the UN and AU are meant to undertake joint analysis and planning, and what is needed to trigger the initial joint planning process, i.e., whether the two Secretariats can initiate this process on their own, or whether the Security Council needs to first provide a green light.
Another area that needs more specifics is the level and type of oversight the Security Council should maintain over missions deployed within the framework of 2719. Article 54 of the UN Charter stipulates that the Council must be kept "fully informed" of all activities "undertaken or in contemplation" through regional arrangements. Resolution 2719 further articulates the need for "regular joint review and reporting processes to ensure oversight by the Council of all authorized operations that access UN assessed contributions." While underscoring autonomy and ownership of AU PSOs, this language leaves room for interpretation, and there are differing takes among Council members. Generally speaking, the P3 (France, United Kingdom, United States) tend to advocate for the Council to remain more hands-on throughout, while China, Russia, and the African members of the Council (A3) support greater AU leadership.
The most contentious element of negotiations on resolution 2719 has been the issue of burden sharing. At the insistence of the United States (US), the resolution includes a cap of 75 percent financing through assessed contributions, with the remaining 25 percent to be jointly mobilized by the AU and UN.
The 25 percent "burden-sharing" gap has caused consternation on the part of the AU, which sees the deployment of its PSOs as a "global good" that should be fully funded via assessed contributions. Options for closing this gap will likely include a combination of the AU Peace Fund and contributions from the European Union (EU) and other donors. While the AU Peace Fund includes a window of funding for PSOs, some African member states are reticent to use the reserve to pay for UN-authorized missions. For its part, the EU already contributes 24 percent of the UN assessed budget. Thus, while it has indicated a willingness to consider further contributions, some EU member states have expressed pause over writing a blank check to cover the 25 percent gap.
If the UN and AU continue to face a "significant shortfall" following joint efforts to mobilize the remaining funds, the Security Council commits to consider "all viable options" to close the gap. Thus, one lingering question is what constitutes "all viable options," and if it includes the use of additional assessed funds.
Another critical topic requiring further clarity is how UN financial regulations and rules-which must be followed, according to the resolution-can be adapted to fit AU-led PSOs. Lessons from Somalia show how difficult this can be, given that UN regulations and rules-including processes for procurement and reimbursement-are designed to serve the purposes of UN peace operations, not to meet the demands of peace enforcement or war fighting. The UN General Assembly's Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) will thus need to initiate action on this issue to date prior to the deployment of a mission.
Moving Beyond Peace Enforcement?
Resolution 2719 is primarily understood by policymakers as a way to support peace enforcement and counterterrorism operations, which fall outside the scope of UN-led peace operations. However, while the resolution refers to the AU's ability to deploy peace enforcement operations "quickly to implement a clear, robust, and focused mandate," it does not delimit the type of PSOs that can access assessed contributions through this framework. Thus, there is a question over whether resolution 2719 may eventually be used to fund a broader range of AU-led missions.
Some member states are wary of this idea, preferring to draw on the AU's comparative advantage of deploying missions as a robust first responder while the UN maintains its role in leading peacekeeping and special political missions. However, the case of Sudan is putting pressure on this position, as any potential mission in the country would likely be led by the AU and not be a peace enforcement operation. Thus, some member states, including the US, have already expressed a more flexible approach to the range of AU-led PSOs that could receive support.
Yet it is not clear what other type of AU-led PSOs might realistically be funded via resolution 2719. The AU could conceivably lead lighter-weight political missions, but these tend to be low-cost and may not require assessed contributions from the UN. On the other end of the spectrum, the AU is far from having the capacity needed to deploy large multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which are not likely to be deployed in the near term.
UN and AU Coordination
One major element to successfully implementing resolution 2719 is ensuring proper coordination among the AU Commission, UN Secretariat, AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), and UN Security Council. While the UN and AU have established mechanisms to facilitate regular technical and political engagement as part of their partnership on peace and security (see figure 1), the processes outlined in 2719 may necessitate refining existing mechanisms and establishing new ones.
An important next step is to map out UN-AU coordination mechanisms and clarify the roles and responsibilities of each organization and their respective departments. However, for the resolution to be implemented successfully, these coordination mechanisms need to be used more practically, not simply as a formality.
This includes the annual consultative meeting between the UN Security Council and AU PSC, which could be better utilized to build strategic alignment and consensus between the councils. Beyond this, additional informal consultations and expert-level exchanges could help foster a common understanding on the implementation of the resolution.
Across all efforts to facilitate coordination, the African members of the Security Council (A3) and the Permanent Observer Mission of the AU to the UN will play critical roles. The A3 are an important bridge between the two councils and could do much to enhance strategic coherence between the UN and AU. The A3 can also catalyze support for the resolution by holding informal discussions with member states outside of the Council, including through the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. The Permanent Observer Mission of the AU to the UN has already demonstrated its critical role in supporting the A3 in negotiating and preparing for the implementation of resolution 2719, and this role will become even more critical after January 1, 2025, when the A3 will have a new configuration without any of the members that co-penned resolution 2719.
The AU will also need to enhance coordination with regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs), which have played a growing role in addressing asymmetric conflicts. While RECs tend to interpret subsidiarity as giving them, rather than the AU, the primary role in maintaining peace and security in their regions, resolution 2719 states that all missions receiving UN financing must be under the direct command and control of the AU. Thus, any subregional forces receiving assessed contributions under resolution 2719 must operate under the management of the AU. This requires the AU and RECs to clarify their division of labor and further standardize, institutionalize, and streamline their processes for mandating and coordinating the deployment of missions.
Potential Test Cases
The AU and UN share a strong commitment to ensuring the success of the first case where resolution 2719 is implemented, since it will inform the future joint authorization of missions. Many are cautious about discussing specific cases, as the AU and UN are still working out the modalities of implementation. Nonetheless, pressing security needs and expectations raised by the adoption of the resolution have spurred discussions about potential test cases.
One of the potential test cases that has received attention is the post-ATMIS mission in Somalia. The AU presence in Somalia has long been burdened by the lack of predictable and sustainable funding. Despite the critical role played by AMISOM/ATMIS in the fight against al-Shabaab, the decision to withdraw the mission was driven primarily by financial considerations rather than the stabilization of the security situation in Somalia. The AU has tried to cover the financial shortfall, including by tapping into the Peace Fund's crisis reserve facility , but this has proved insufficient.
Noting concerns over the financial shortfalls experienced by ATMIS, the AU PSC has urged support for a post-ATMIS mission, potentially under the framework of resolution 2719. However, there is no consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council and the current A3 members on whether the post-ATMIS mission will be able to access UN assessed contributions under the framework of resolution 2719.
With Somalia joining the Security Council as an elected member in 2025, there is likely to be a further push from within the Council to finance the follow-on mission (AUSSOM) through resolution 2719. Considering Somalia's current security needs, it remains critical to identify the added value of the follow-on mission and how differently it would respond to the continued threat of al-Shabaab.
Some have suggested that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could be another test case for 2719. In December 2023, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) deployed a mission to the DRC, known as SAMIDRC. Although SAMIDRC is not an AU-mandated mission, the Security Council has authorized MONUSCO to support coordination, information-sharing, and technical assistance to allow SAMIDRC to use its logistical assets and military capabilities. However, because the mission is not under the command and control of the AU, this arrangement does not currently fall within the parameters and conditions set under resolution 2719.
A third possible test case is a new mission that could be deployed to Sudan. Sudan has a history of hosting both AU and UN missions, including the former AU-UN hybrid mission, UNAMID. With the deteriorating security situation after the outbreak of civil war in April 2023 and the limited results of efforts to reach a cease-fire agreement, there have been calls, particularly from Sudanese civil society actors, to deploy a mission to urgently protect civilians and address the humanitarian crisis.
However, unlike the DRC and Somalia, Sudan would need to see progress on mediation or greater political momentum around the deployment of a multilateral mission, particularly considering the difficulty of obtaining host-state consent. The Sudanese government has also had a complex relationship with peace operations in the past, as evidenced by the experiences of the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). As noted above, in the current context, a mission deployed to Sudan under resolution 2719 would take a different form than the peace enforcement operations usually associated with the resolution. The case of Sudan presents an opportunity for both the AU and the UN to employ innovative tools that combine military elements and robust civil affairs components.
The Way Forward
While the adoption of resolution 2719 is an important step in consolidating the UN-AU partnership, aspects of the resolution that were left intentionally vague now require clarity. This is where much of the real work begins.
A first critical step is for the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission to finish the joint planning guidelines to clarify what is required to trigger the initial planning process and specificities on joint planning, budgeting, reporting, and roles and responsibilities. These details need to be determined and agreed upon by both organizations before implementing the resolution.
The UN and AU also need to develop modalities for coordinating and making decisions on any potential AU-led PSO funded through 2719. This includes strengthening formal council-to-council engagement and new mechanisms to facilitate regular interaction at the expert level.
The issue of burden-sharing is another critical area to address, and stakeholders will need to balance the call for the AU to shoulder some of the financial burden with AU member states' reticence to pull from the AU Peace Fund. While funding modalities to cover the 25 percent gap will vary by context, member states should not wait until a mission is needed to map out viable solutions, as this could derail planning processes.
Finally, the General Assembly, through the Fifth Committee and the Advisory Body on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, in coordination with the Department of Operational Support, should consider how to adapt UN regulations and rules to fit the needs of AU-led PSOs. This includes consideration of AU-specific personnel- and contingent-owned equipment reimbursement systems and procurement processes designed to meet the needs of kinetic environments.
While the administrative and political issues that need to be resolved remain significant, officials and member states have demonstrated a high level of resolve to work through them. Ensuring the successful implementation of the framework in the coming months will be a crucial test not only to solidify this new era of partnership between the two organizations but also to ensure that the international community is able to effectively respond to today's pressing crises.